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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,
CaseNo.981555-CA

Plaintiff and Appellee,
vs.

Priority No. 2

JOHN RICHARD KOCHER,
Defendant and Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLEE
* **

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The defendant appeals from a judgment of conviction for Theft, a second degree
felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-404 (1995), and Reckless Driving, a class B
misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-45 (1993). This Court has jurisdiction
under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (1996).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
Issue on Appeal. The sole issue on appeal is whether the trial court committed error
requiring reversal of his theft conviction when it permitted a state witness to testify as to
whether or not he believed defendant's driving behavior at an intersection was deliberate or
accidental.1

defendant does not challenge on appeal his conviction for reckless driving.
Indeed, at trial, defendant successfully argued that although he was guilty of reckless
driving, he was not guilty of aggravated assault. R. 129: 287, 292.
1

Standard of Review. This Court reviews a trial court's rulings on the admissibility
of opinion testimony by a lay witness for an abuse of discretion. See State v. Stringham, 957
P.2d 602, 607 (Utah App. 1998) (holding that the trial court's decisions regarding the
admissibility of expert opinion testimony is reviewed for an abuse of discretion); see also
State v. Larsen, 865 P.2d 1355, 1361 (Utah 1993).2 Under this standard, the Court will not
find an abuse of discretion unless the trial court's determination was beyond the limits of
reasonability. Id.; State v. Hamilton, 827 P.2d 232, 239-40 (Utah 1992). However, even
where a trial court abuses its discretion in admitting evidence, the appellate court will not
reverse the conviction if the error was harmless. Hamilton, 827 P.2d at 240 (citing State v.
Verde, 770 P.2d 116, 120 (Utah 1989)).

2

Because the trial court's inquiry regarding the admissibility of lay opinion
testimony is similar to that of expert opinion testimony, the same standard of review
* should be applied. In determining the admissibility of expert testimony, a trial court must
determine "whether, 'on balance, the evidence will be helpful to the finder of fact.'"
Larsen, 865 P.2d at 1361 (quoting State v. Rimmasch, 775 P.2d 388, 398 n. 8 (Utah
1989)). Accordingly, the trial court is given broad discretion in making decisions on the
admissibility of expert testimony. Stringham, 957 P.2d at 607. In like manner, the trial
court must also make a "helpfulness" inquiry in ruling on the admissibility of opinion
testimony by a lay witness. Utah R. Evid. 701 (1998) (as part of its analysis, the trial
court must determine whether the testimony will be "helpful to a clear understanding of
the witness' testimony or the determination of a fact in issue"). Therefore, like its rulings
on expert testimony, the trial court is entitled to broad discretion in rulings on the
admissibility of lay opinion testimony. In both cases, the trial court is in the best position
to assess the evidence and determine whether the testimony will be helpful to the fact
finder. This standard of review is consistent with that afforded federal district courts in
their rule 701 rulings. See United States v. Garcia, 994 F.2d 1499, 1506 (10th Cir. 1993).
2

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES. AND RULES
The interpretation of constitutional provisions, statutes, or rules are not determinative
of the appeal or of central importance to the appeal, the following rules are determinative
of the appeal or of central importance to the appeal.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
SUMMARY OF PROCEEDINGS BELOW

Defendant was charged by information with one count of theft, a second degree
felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-404 (1995), and one count of aggravated
assault, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-103 (Supp. 1995).
Following a jury trial, defendant was convicted of theft as charged and reckless driving, a
lesser included offense of aggravated assault. R. 104, 108, 129: 296. Defendant was later
sentenced to an indeterminate term of one-to-fifteen years in the Utah State Prison on the
theft conviction, and a concurrent jail term of 180 days on the reckless driving conviction.3
R. 129:111-12. Defendant timely filed a Notice ofAppeal with the trial court. R. 129:122.
SUMMARY OF FACTS

Request to Take a Test Drive. At approximately six o'clock in the evening of May
29, 1997, Robert Broadbent, a car salesman for Brison Imports, observed a car drive up to
the dealership and drop off a man who he believed to be defendant. R. 129: 113, 126.
Thereafter, defendant asked Broadbent which of two cars was fastest. R. 129: 121. After
3

Although the original judgment indicated that defendant's conviction for reckless
driving was a class A misdemeanor, R. 129: 112, that part of the judgment was later
amended to correctly reflect that the reckless driving conviction was a class B
misdemeanor. R. 129: 131.
3

discussing the various features and switches in a 1992 red Mitsubishi 3000GT that was for
sale on the lot, defendant asked Broadbent if he could take the car for a test drive. R. 129:
112-13, 119-20, 122. After making sure he was covered by another employee at the
dealership, Broadbent agreed to allow defendant to take the car for a test drive. R. 129:114.
Deviation from the Test Drive Route. Broadbent accompanied defendant on the test
drive pursuant to the dealership's policy, directing defendant where to turn based on an
established route for test driving cars. R. 129: 114-15. Defendant followed Broadbent's
instructions until they had driven about halfway through the route. R. 129: 115. However,
when Broadbent asked defendant to move into the right lane to turn right onto 7th East from
4500 South, defendant remained in the center lane, stopping for a red light at the intersection
of 4500 South and 7th East. R. 129: 115, 127. Broadbent then instructed defendant to turn
right at the next light. R. 129: 115. Consistent with Broadbent's instructions, defendant
drove to 9th East and made a right turn. R. 129: 115,127. At this point, Broadbent became
"a little bit agitated" and told defendant that he did not have the time to drive all over and
that they needed to get back. R. 129:115. Defendant then followed Broadbent's instruction
to turn right off of 9th East. R. 129: 115. Defendant next stopped for a stop sign at Vine
Street. R. 129: 115, 123. However, instead of turning right back towards the dealership,
defendant drove straight ahead and stopped in the middle of the road where they were nearly
hit by oncoming traffic. R. 129:115,123-25. Broadbent instructed defendant to gently pull
the car off the road where they could regroup and defendant drove the car straight ahead into
a residential area. R. 129: 115, 124, 127-28. After driving into the residential area,

4

defendant indicated that he was too shook up and asked Broadbent to drive back to the
dealership. R. 129: 116,197.
Theft of the Car. Broadbent told defendant that he would be more than happy to drive
back and exited the vehicle to switch seats with defendant. R. 129:116-17. However, after
Broadbent exited the vehicle, defendant drove away without him. R. 129:117,128,197-98.
Broadbent went to a nearby residence where he used a cordless telephone to call the police.
R. 129:117-18. Approximately ten minutes later, as he talked with police on the telephone
in the front yard of the residence, Broadbent saw defendant drive nearby. R. 129: 118.
U-Haul Rental.

Sometime near noon the following day, defendant took an

acquaintance, identified as Craig Neff, to Beehive RV Storage in the stolen car. R. 129:134,
141, 147, 156, 158, 199-200. They discussed the rental of a U-Haui with Gwendolyn
Bronson, an employee at Beehive RV Storage, who then accompanied them to where the UHaul was located in the facility. R. 129: 134, 140-41. Bronson left the two at the U-Haul
and returned to the office to retrieve a key.

R. 129: 141-42.

Because she felt

"uncomfortable" about the two, she called the police when she returned to the office. R. 129:
134.
Defendant's Escape from Police. Police arrived shortly thereafter. R. 129: 134-35.
While Bronson was discussing her concerns with the police, she saw defendant in the car
turning a comer around a building and she then alerted the officers that he was coming. R.
129:137-38,151-52,155. As defendant started to come around the comer of the building,
which was approximately 75 feet from the exit, an officer stood in front of the exit and
signaled defendant to stop. R. 129: 138, 147-48, 151-52, 155. However, rather than stop,
5

defendant accelerated directly towards where the officer stood. R. 129: 139, 148, 155.
Defendant did not swerve or otherwise slow down to avoid the officer. R. 129: 139, 149,
156, 210. After the vehicle accelerated, the officer ran out of the way of the vehicle,
avoiding being hit by approximately three feet. R. 129: 142, 149, 155. Had the officer not
moved, he would have been hit by the car. R. 129: 142,149.
Defendant's Arrest. After defendant drove away, another officer interviewed Craig
Neff whom defendant had left at Beehive RV Storage. R. 129: 156-57, 200-01. In the
course of his discussions with Neff, the officer drove him to various locations in connection
with another investigation and eventually dropped Neff off at his home in a trailer park in
Draper. R. 129: 157, 199. The following day, the officer returned to Neff s trailer on a
hunch. R. 129: 158. The officer spoke with Neff outside his trailer a few minutes after he
arrived at which time Neff notified the officer that defendant was in his trailer sleeping. R.
129: 158. The officer then entered the trailer and arrested defendant. R. 129: 159. During
the course of the arrest, the officer found the key and key tag to the stolen car. R. 129: 159.
At the time of arrest, defendant denied having taken the car. R. 129: 160-61, 202.
Admissions bv Defendant. At some point after his arrest, defendant expressed a
desire to speak with police. R. 129: 165. Accordingly, a detective with the police
department was summoned to the vehicle where defendant was being held. R. 129:165-66.
However, when the detective asked where the car was located, defendant said that he did not
know. R. 129:166. The detective then left the vehicle, explaining to defendant that he was
not going to waste any more time with him. R. 129: 166. On the way to jail, however,
defendant indicated to the transporting officer that he wished to speak and that the car was
6

at an apartment complex in West Valley. R. 129: 159, 166. The detective was again
summoned to defendant at which time defendant told the detective that the car was in the
parking lot of an apartment building on Redwood Road just south of Callister's. R. 129:16667.
Recovery of the Stolen Car. After searching two or three apartment complexes in the
area described by defendant, the detective found the stolen car in a guest parking area of the
Summerset Village Apartments. R. 129: 167, 169. The car was concealed by a light blue
car cover, but otherwise appeared to be undamaged. R. 129: 168. The officer testified that
he looked under the car cover to examine the car because his experience had taught him that
stolen cars are often concealed with car covers. R. 129: 168.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
Defendant appeals his conviction for theft, arguing that the trial court abused its
discretion when it allowed Robert Broadbent to testify that he believed defendant deliberately
stopped in the middle of the road during a test drive. However, because any error, if any,
was harmless, this Court need not examine the trial court's ruling. The only issue at trial was
whether defendant intended to permanently or temporarily deprive Brison Imports of the car.
The State presented substantial evidence supporting the inference that defendant took the car
with the purpose to permanently deprive Brison Imports thereof. Moreover, the challenged
testimony was not critical to the State's case. Accordingly, the Court should affirm
defendant's conviction because even absent the challenged testimony, no reasonable
likelihood exists that the jury would have convicted defendant ofjoyriding rather than theft.

7

ARGUMENT
L

ANY ERROR BY THE TRIAL COURT IN ADMITTING THE
CHALLENGED TESTIMONY WAS HARMLESS.
A.

Because Defendant Conceded That He Exercised Unauthorized
Control over the Brison Imports Car, the Only Issue at Trial Was
Defendant's Purpose in Taking the Vehicle.

At trial, the State was required to prove that (1) defendant obtained or exercised
unauthorized control (2) over a motor vehicle owned by another (3) with the purpose to
deprive the owner thereof. R. 90; Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-404 (1995). The trial court also
gave a lesser included instruction, allowing the jury to convict defendant of "joyriding" or
unlawful control of a motor vehicle. R. 92. To obtain a conviction for this offense, the State
was required to prove that (1) defendant exercised unauthorized control (2) over a motor
vehicle not his own (3) with the intent to temporarily deprive the owner or lawful custodian
of possession thereof.4 R. 92; Utah Code Ann. § 41-la-1314(l) (Supp. 1997). While
joyriding requires a showing that defendant intended to temporarily deprive the owner of
possession of the vehicle, theft requires a showing that defendant intended to permanently
- deprive the owner of possession of the vehicle.5

Joyriding also requires the State to prove that defendant did not have the owner's
consent to take the vehicle (an element which appears to be implicit in a finding of
"unauthorized" control). R. 92; Utah Code Ann. § 41-la-1314(l) (Supp. 1997). The
instructions also indicated that the State must establish that defendant did not return the
vehicle within 24 hours after the exercise of unlawful control. R. 92.
5

To sustain a conviction for theft, the State was required to establish that defendant
took the car "with the purpose to deprive the owner thereof." R. 90; Utah Code Ann. §
76-6-404.. The jury was instructed that "'[p]urpose to deprive' means to have the
conscious object to withhold property permanently or for so extended a period or to use
under circumstances that a substantial portion of its economic value, or of the use and
8

The State's evidence that defendant drove away in the Brison Imports car without
consent or other authorization of the dealership, see supra, at 4-5, was not challenged at trial
nor is it challenged on appeal. Defendant himself testified that he drove away in the Brison
Imports car after Broadbent exited the vehicle to switch seats with him. R. 129:197-98,204.
He did not contend that he had consent to take the car or was otherwise authorized to do so.
Indeed, the defense conceded in closing that defendant exercised unauthorized control over
the car. R. 129:287. The defense argued instead that he should be found guilty ofjoyriding,
rather than theft, because he only intended to temporarily deprive Brison Imports of
possession thereof. R. 129: 287-88.
B.

A Conviction Will Not Be Reversed Unless the Trial Court
Committed Reversible Error.

The sole issue on appeal is whether the trial court committed reversible error when
it permitted Robert Broadbent to testify as to whether he believed defendant's driving
behavior at an intersection was deliberate or accidental. "[L]ike any other evidentiary ruling,
an erroneous decision to admit or exclude evidence based on rule [701] cannot result in
* reversible error unless the error is harmful." See Hamilton, 827 P.2d at 240. Therefore, even
if this Court were to conclude that the trial court's admission of Robert Broadbent's
challenged testimony was improper, such a conclusion would not be definitive of the issue.
ShouJd the Court conclude that admission of evidence was improper, the conviction cannot

benefit thereof, would be lost, or to restore the property only upon payment of a reward or
other compensation, or to dispose of the property under circumstances that make it
unlikely that the owner will recover it.9' R. 91. For ease and clarity in argument, the State
will refer to this mens rea element generally as a purpose to "permanently deprive."
9

be reversed unless the Court also finds that the error was harmful. Id. "Conversely, [the
appellate court] can make an examination of the correctness of the trial court's rule [701]
ruling unnecessary by finding that any error was harmless." Id. In this case, the Court need
not decide whether or not the trial court improperly admitted Robert Broadbent's challenged
testimony because any such error, if any, was harmless.
An error will be deemed harmful "if absent the error[,] there is a reasonable likelihood
of an outcome more favorable to the defendant." Dunn, 850 P.2d at 1221. An error will
require reversal only if the likelihood of a more favorable outcome is "sufficiently high to
undermine confidence in the verdict." State v. Knight, 734 P.2d 913, 920 (Utah 1987).
Stated in another way, harmless errors are those errors which "are sufficiently
inconsequential that [the appellate court] conclude[s] there is no reasonable likelihood that
the error affected the outcome of the proceedings." Verde, 770 P.2d at 120. The appellate
court may consider a host of factors in assessing whether or not an error is harmful, including
"the importance of the witness' testimony to the prosecution's case and the overall strength
of the State's case." Hamilton, 827 P.2d at 240. As explained below, consideration of these
factors alone is sufficient to support a finding of harmless error.
C.

Admission of the Challenged Testimony Did Not Undermine
Confidence in the Verdict.

As discussed above, the only issue at trial was whether defendant intended to
temporarily deprive Brison Imports of the car (which would result in a conviction for
joyriding) or permanently deprive Brison Imports of the car (which would result in a
conviction for theft). Because the only issue at trial was defendant's purpose in taking the
10

car, this Court must determine whether, absent Broadbent's challenged testimony, there is
a reasonable likelihood the jury would have convicted defendant of joyriding rather than
theft. See Dunn, 850 P.2d at 1221.
1.

The State Introduced Substantial Evidence of Defendant's
Intent to Permanently Deprive Brison Imports of the Car.

Because criminal intent can seldom be proved by direct evidence, it generally must
be "inferredfromthe circumstances of the given facts." State v. Castonguay, 663 P.2d 1323,
1326 (Utah 1983); see also State v. Davis, 711 P.2d 232, 234 (Utah 1985) (holding that
"intent need not be proved by direct evidence, but may be inferred from defendant's conduct
and surrounding circumstances"). In this case, the jury's finding that defendant intended to
permanently deprive Brison Imports of the car was supported by substantial evidence, even
absent the challenged testimony. Accordingly, no reasonable likelihood exists that absent
the challenged testimony the jury would have returned a verdict of guilty to joyriding rather
than theft.
Defendant's Failure to Return the Car After the Alleged Threat Disappeared.
Defendant claimed that he intended to return the car. R. 129: 197-99, 204, 206-07. He
alleged that he drove away without the salesman only because he saw a man named Terry
Lewis with some of his "puppets" with a gun and that he was afraid they were going to shoot
himandBroadbent R. 129:197-98. However, defendant's failure to immediately return the
car thereafter is wholly inconsistent with such an implausible claim and strongly
substantiates afindingof an intent to permanently deprive. Some ten minutes after he took
the car, Broadbent saw defendant drive by and turn down Vine Street. Defendant testified
11

that he drove back to the area to check on the salesman but that he did not see him. R. 129:
199. However, with the apparent threat no longer present (since defendant was willing to go
back and look for Broadbent), no reason existed that would prevent defendant from driving
back to the dealership to return the car. Defendant did not follow this course of action.
When questioned on cross examination as to why he did not drive the car back to the
dealership, defendant could only explain that he was under the influence of
methamphetamine and was not in his right mind. R. 129: 207. Yet, Broadbent testified that
defendant did not appear nervous, excited, or otherwise affected physically during the test
drive and that his driving was acceptable except at the intersection on Vine Street. R. 129:
123,125.
Defendant's Activities in the Car the Following Day. Not only did defendant fail to
return the car that evening, but he also failed to return it to the dealership the following day.
Instead, defendant drove Craig Neff to Beehive RV Storage in the car the following
afternoon to help him rent a U-Haul. R. 129: 200-01. When he saw the police, instead of
offering an explanation, he fled in the car, ignoring an officer's command to stop and
narrowly missing the officer who had to run out of the way of the oncoming car. R. 129:
139, 142, 148-4,155-56, 201. Again, the jury could reasonably infer that these actions are
not consistent with someone who only intended to take the car temporarily. Defendant
explained at trial that he fled because he thought he was being set up. R. 129: 201. He
testified that he had used false identification to obtain the U-Haul at Neff s suggestion and
did not want to be arrested by the police. R. 129: 201. This explanation is weak and

12

unconvincing. Moreover, it only serves to shed further doubt on defendant's overall
credibility as a witness.
Concealment of the Car. As further evidence of defendant's intent to permanently
deprive Brison Imports of the car, defendant did not simply park the car in the parking lot,
but covered it with a blue car cover—an act which is often done to conceal stolen cars.6 R.
129: 168. Moreover, defendant initially denied having the car, explaining his fear of being
arrested. R. 129:160-61,166,202. He later admitted to having the car and told the detective
that it was at an apartment complex on Redwood Road just south of Callister's. R. 129:167.
Other Inferential Evidence. As explained above, defendant's conduct after he took
the car constituted strong and substantial evidence of his intention to permanently deprive
the dealership of the car. However, his actions before he drove away in the car also provided
some support that he came to the dealership with an intent to steal the car. The salesman
testified that he believed he observed defendant arrive at the dealership in a car which left
after he exited the vehicle, leading to an inference that defendant was stranded at the
dealership with no way to get home.7 R. 129: 113, 126. Moreover, the evidence also
suggested that defendant expressed little or no interest in purchasing the car. Although
defendant wished to take a test drive in the car, he did not discuss purchasing the car or how

6

Although his ex-wife said nothing about the car cover, defendant testified that he
covered the car so his ex-wife would know where it was at. R. 129: 208.
7

Defendant countered that he took the bus to the dealership and intended to leave
on the bus. R. 129:203.
13

to finance the purchase of the car.8 R. 129: 120-21. Instead, defendant focused his
questioning to specific features of the car and its comparative speed to another car. R. 129:
119-21. These facts, standing alone, may not substantiate a finding of an intent to
permanently deprive Brison Imports of the car. However, when viewed in light of his
conduct after he drove away in the car, they support an inference that defendant came to the
dealership with an intent to steal the car.
2.

Evidence Introduced by the Defense to Establish an Intent to
Temporarily Deprive Was Weak and Often Supported a
Finding of an Intent to Permanently Deprive.

Inconsistent Testimony from Ex-Wife. To substantiate his claim that he merely
intended to temporarily deprive Brison Imports of the car, defendant called as a witness his
ex-wife, Barbara Kocher. R. 129: 170. However, Ms. Kocher's testimony only served to
discredit defendant's claim. She claimed that defendant telephoned her from Draper the day
before he was arrested. R. 129: 173. Defendant, on the other hand, testified that when he
made the call to his ex-wife, he told her that he needed to get hack to the trailer in Draper
to meet his girlfriend. R. 129: 199.
Ms. Kocher also testified that defendant asked her to get the keys from him in Draper,
pick up the car at some apartments by A-l Callister's, and return it to the dealership. R. 129:
171-176. She did not indicate that defendant provided her with any further information, but
testified that because she had to pick up the keys from him, she would leam the exact
location of the car from defendant at that time. R. 129: 176-77. Conversely, defendant

8

While Broadbent testified that they did not discuss financing, defendant claimed
that they did so. R. 129: 197.
14

testified that he specifically told his ex-wife at which apartment the car was located, and,
moreover, that the car was covered with a blue car cover, a fact which Ms. Kocher omitted
in her testimony. R. 129:208.
Evidence of a Threat or Auto Theft. Defendant's girlfriend, Stacey Belgard, testified
that Lewis had, in the past, held her for hours and assaulted her, and had continued to
threaten her. R. 129:181-85. She claimed that she recently received a threat from Lewis on
her voice mail in which she could hear a gunshot and Lewis' laugh in the background. R.
129:185. She testified that she met Lewis through a circle of friends and that defendant was
also associated with Lewis, although allegedly not on good terms. R. 129: 186-87.
Defendant also testified that he was associated with Lewis because he was going to shoot
him. R. 129:205. He further testified that Lewis was known for stealing cars. R. 129: 198.
To substantiate his claim that Lewis represented a bonafidethreat, defendant called
Detective Holly Wright. R. 129: 223. However, while her testimony may have supported
the claim that Lewis was known for beating people, it also strongly supported an inference
that defendant took the car in connection with an auto theft ring. Detective Wright testified
that Lewis did, in fact, have a reputation for beating people. R. 129:228. However, she also
testified that Lewis was a suspect in an auto theft case and was rumored to be involved in an
auto theft ring. R. 129: 226-28. Detective Wright testified that she had heard of certain
individuals apprehended for auto theft that have claimed Lewis told them to take the cars.
R. 129:228-29. She further testified that "quite a few" others have claimed that they were
acting for Lewis when committing crimes. Accordingly, given defendant's admitted
association and familiarity with Lewis, Wright's testimony supported an inference that
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defendant took the car in connection with the auto theft ring in which Lewis was rumored to
be a part.
3.

Broadbent's Challenged Testimony Was Inconsequential to the
Outcome of the Case.

The challenged testimony from Broadbent was not critical to the State's case and there
is no reasonable likelihood that the jury's verdict would have been different absent the
testimony. See Dunn, 850 P.2d at 1221. The testimony was not like that which the State
unsuccessfully attempted to introduce from Gwendolyn Bronson as defendant suggests.
Aplt. Brf. at 19. When the prosecutor asked Ms. Bronson whether she believed defendant
deliberately or accidentally aimed the car at the officer as he drove through Beehive RV
Storage, the trial court sustained defendant's objection. R. 129: 140-41. However, that
opinion went to the ultimate issue to be decided by the jury with respect to the second
count—whether defendant intended to assault the officer or was simply driving in wanton
disregard for the officer's safety. See R. 95,98. A question of similar import in the context
of theft and joyriding would be whether Broadbent believed defendant intended to take the
car temporarily or permanently. Broadbent's testimony did not address this ultimate issue.
While his testimony may support an inference that defendant was creating a ruse to take the
car (which would not appear to be necessary), it falls far short of supporting an inference that
he intended to permanently deprive Brison Imports of the car.
Moreover, as discussed above, the State introduced substantial evidence, apart from
Broadbent's challenged testimony, that supported an inference that defendant took the car
with the purpose to permanently deprive Brison Imports thereof. Given the strong and
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substantial evidence supporting a finding that defendant intended to permanently deprive
Brison Imports of the car, any error in admitting the challenged testimony of Broadbent was
inconsequential. See Verde, 11Q P.2d at 120. The strongest evidence of defendant's intent
to permanently deprive Brison Imports of the car came after he fled in the car and then failed
to return it to the dealership. Accordingly, any error in admitting the testimony is harmless
and the Court need not address the trial court's ruling on the admissibility of the testimony.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, the State respectfully requests that the Court affirm
defendant's conviction.
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